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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold Turo Inc. (“Turo”), a web-based car sharing 
platform, liable for the conduct of its users—their decisions to list their cars on the Turo website as 
being available for exchange at San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”) and their 
consummation of the exchanges at SFO.  Plaintiff alleges that these car exchanges are unlawful and 
violate California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”). 
Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act, 
47 U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA” or “Section 230”) because the claim seeks to hold Turo liable for what 
its users post on the platform and for its users’ actions in exchanging their vehicles at SFO.  Turo’s 
car sharing platform operates much like other online marketplaces: car owners can list their own 
cars on Turo, indicating availability and where the car can be delivered for exchange.  Prospective 
drivers can search available cars and book the car through Turo’s website.  Once booked, the users 
then meet to exchange the car at an agreed-upon location and time.  Notably, it is Turo’s users, not 
Turo, that create the listings, book cars, and decide when and where to exchange cars.  Turo 
provides the online platform that allows users to connect. 
Section 230 grants “broad immunity” to online services that publish content “provided 
primarily by third parties.”  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2003).  It applies to a wide range of claims and insulates web services from “‘any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.’”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)).   
Because Plaintiff seeks to hold Turo liable for the actions of Turo’s users, Turo is immune 
under Section 230, and this action should be dismissed on Section 230 grounds.   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Founded in 2009, Turo (f.k.a. RelayRides, Inc.) is a San Francisco-based technology 
company that provides its community of users a “web-based” platform to share cars on a short-term 
basis.  (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 5.)  Turo users can use Turo’s website and mobile-device app to 
access Turo’s car-sharing platform.  (Id. ¶ 18.)  Car owners can list their own cars on Turo (Turo 
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does not have its own fleet of cars), indicating calendar availability and where the owner is open to 
delivering the car to drivers.  (Id. ¶¶ 18, 28.)  Users looking for a car can search the available cars 
on Turo according to various criteria, including the location for receiving the car.  If a user identifies 
a car that she wants to use, she can book the car with the owner through Turo’s online platform, 
and the users then meet at their mutually agreed time and place.  (See id. ¶¶ 18, 20.)  Users, not 
Turo, create their own listings and decide when and where to exchange cars.  (Id. ¶¶ 18, 28.)  Turo 
does not require specific exchange locations.  (See id. ¶ 28.) 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general 
demurrer.”  Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 4th 446, 452 (2004).  It determines 
“whether or not the factual allegations that the plaintiff makes are sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action.”  Id. at 452-453.  In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court admits all 
material facts, but does not accept as true “contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”  
DiPirro v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 966, 972 (2004). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The CDA provides broad immunity to web-based platforms for user conduct.  
In enacting the CDA, Congress created broad federal immunity for claims against online 
service providers such as Turo based on content created by users: “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Section 230 thus prevents an 
online platform (a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service”) from facing liability for 
information published or spoken by others (“another information content provider”).  And Congress 
expressly preempted all state laws that are inconsistent with this immunity.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) 
(“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law 
that is inconsistent with this section.”); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (“[p]reemption [under Section 230] is express”). 
In enacting Section 230, Congress sought “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
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Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (Congress sought “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated 
development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce”).  
Congress thus provided “broad immunity” for claims against online services that publish content 
“provided primarily by third parties.”  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Section 230 immunity is broad”).  
Courts recognize that “‘close cases . . . must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart 
out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites.’”  Jones v. Dirty 
World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fair Hous. Council of 
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
Importantly, courts “resolve the question of [Section] 230 immunity at the earliest possible 
stage of [a] case because that immunity protects websites not only from ‘ultimate liability’, but also 
from ‘having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.’”  Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28 
(Section 230 “‘can [ ] support a motion to dismiss if the statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the 
face of the complaint.’”) (citations omitted)). 
Consistent with the broad statutory grant of immunity and the policy of resolving Section 
230 immunity as early as possible, courts have repeatedly found that online services such as eBay, 
Craigslist, StubHub, Yelp, and Google are immune under Section 230 from claims based on the 
activity of the services’ users, frequently on the pleadings.  See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 
4th 816, 828 (2002) (affirming order sustaining demurrer and finding eBay immune from liability 
for fake sports memorabilia listings); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735(RMB), 2009 WL 
1704355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss and finding Craigslist immune 
under CDA for sale of allegedly unlawful item resulting from listing); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 
N.C. App. 227, 247-48 (2012) (CDA barred claim that StubHub hosting of event ticket sales 
violated state anti-scalping law); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(affirming grant of motion to dismiss and finding CDA barred claims against Yelp related to its star 
rating system); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting 
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motion to dismiss and finding Google immune for its keyword suggestion tool that suggested 
allegedly misleading terms). 
Moreover, immunity applies both to claims where third-party users post offending content 
online—e.g., defamation—and to claims where a plaintiff seeks to hold the online platform liable 
for users’ offline conduct.  See, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 572-76 (2009) 
(affirming order sustaining demurrer and holding CDA barred negligence claims related to offline 
sexual assault); Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (on the pleadings, 
finding Section 230 barred public nuisance claim related to the solicitation and facilitation of offline 
prostitution leading to significant law enforcement expenditures); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., 
Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (granting motion 
to dismiss and finding Section 230 immunity applied to website following an offline drug overdose 
resulting from the sale of drugs on its platform).  
B. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Section 230.  
Section 230 preemption applies when three elements are met: (1) the defendant is a provider 
or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of action treats the defendant as a publisher 
or speaker of information; and (3) the information at issue is provided by another information 
content provider.  Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 804-05 (2006); see also 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). 
All three elements are met here. 
1. Turo is an interactive computer service.  
An interactive computer service is “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server. . . .”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  Turo is “web-based” and allows multiple users to post and search vehicle 
listings on its website.  (Compl. ¶ 18.)  Turo’s platform is thus a quintessential “interactive 
computer service.”  See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268 (noting that “the most common interactive 
computer services are websites”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Facebook is an “interactive computer service” 
provider; affirming grant of motion to dismiss); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 969 
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(N.D. Cal. 2016) (Twitter is an “interactive computer service” provider; granting motion to 
dismiss); Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 831 (eBay is an “interactive computer service” provider); 
Gibson, 2009 WL 1704355, at *4 (Craigslist is an “interactive computer service” provider); Hill, 
219 N.C. App. at 237 (Stubhub is an “interactive computer service” provider); Goddard, 640 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1197-98 (Google is an “interactive computer service” provider). 
2. The Complaint treats Turo as a publisher of third-party information.  
Plaintiff’s claims also treat Turo as a publisher of third-party information because Plaintiff 
seeks to hold Turo liable for third-party information from Turo’s users that appears on its site and 
for Turo’s decisions about what Turo chooses to permit or exclude on its platform.  
a. Plaintiff seeks to hold Turo liable for publishing user content.  
At its core, Plaintiff’s theory of liability is that Turo violated the UCL by allowing its users   
to use its website to specify and select SFO as a vehicle-exchange location and by allowing its users 
to make car exchanges on SFO property.  (See Compl. ¶¶ 19-29 (alleging Turo’s website 
“facilitate[s] rental transactions at SFO”); id. ¶ 34 (describing Turo’s allegedly unlawful activity 
including “curbside transactions,” using and driving upon SFO roads, entering SFO and “operating 
a business on Airport property”); id. ¶ 38 (alleging that Turo has “commercially exploited SFO’s 
roadways and facilities,” “participat[ed] in unlawful curbside pickups”).)  As the Complaint alleges, 
using Turo’s website, Turo’s car-owning users create listings and “select whether they are willing 
to deliver to various airports, including SFO.”  (See id. ¶ 28.)  Other Turo users can search these 
listings, including by selecting desired exchange locations.  (See id. ¶ 27.)   
Through this third-party content, Turo’s users thus arrange the exchanges that Plaintiff 
alleges violate SFO policies and that underlie Plaintiff’s claim against Turo.  Put differently, Turo’s 
allegedly unlawful and unfair behavior all derives from its users’ listing of and reservation of 
vehicles on the Turo platform and their exchange of cars at SFO.  Plaintiff is therefore seeking to 
hold Turo liable on the basis of its role as publisher of its users’ listings and reservations.  See 
Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 828 (“[B]y its ‘plain language,’ [Section 230] created a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make interactive service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the service.”) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330)). 
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Plaintiff may argue that the Complaint seeks to hold Turo liable for its own conduct in 
operating its web-based platform, rather than the user content appearing on that platform.  But it is 
not Turo’s conduct that Plaintiff alleges was illegal.  Rather it is the alleged acts committed by 
Turo’s users (listing cars, reserving cars, and exchange cars at SFO) that is allegedly illegal.1  The 
court in La Park La Brea A LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2017), recently 
dealt with a similar issue.  Plaintiffs sought to hold Airbnb liable for listings of units where the 
underlying leases prohibited short-term rentals.  The court found that because “Airbnb hosts—not 
Airbnb—are responsible for providing the actual listing information,” Airbnb was entitled to 
Section 230 protection.  Id. at 1105 (granting motion to dismiss).2  Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim here 
is based on user listings, not Turo’s conduct.  
b. Turo cannot be liable for its editorial decisions about what 
content to include or exclude on its platform.  
Plaintiff may also argue that it seeks to hold Turo liable for its decision to allow users to 
post listings that designate SFO as an exchange location on its platform, leading to exchanges at 
                                                 
1 Plaintiff may argue that the content on Turo’s website promoting SFO as an exchange location 
makes Turo independently liable for the alleged UCL violations.  (See Compl. ¶ 38 (“by actively 
promoting SFO rental car transactions after the expiration of its permit, Turo has misled both car 
owners and prospective renters about the lawfulness of such transactions and placed Turo car 
owners at risk of civil and criminal liability”).)  However, this allegation only serves to highlight 
the fact that it is Turo’s users’ content and conduct—their posts and the actual car exchanges—that 
is at the root of the allegedly illegal “transactions” that underlie the UCL claim.  (See Compl. ¶¶ 19-
29 (alleging Turo’s website “facilitate[s] rental transactions at SFO”); id. ¶ 34 (describing Turo’s 
allegedly unlawful activity including “curbside transactions,” using and driving upon SFO roads, 
entering SFO and “operating a business on Airport property”); id. ¶ 38 (alleging that Turo has 
“commercially exploited SFO’s roadways and facilities” and “participat[ed] in unlawful curbside 
pickups”).)  The CDA provides immunity to Turo for this user content and conduct, without which 
there would be no alleged violation.     
2 By contrast, the courts in Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 
1072-73 (N.D. Cal. 2016), and Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-cv-06641 
ODW(AFM), 2018 WL 1281772, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) found liability where Airbnb and 
Homeaway.com allegedly violated municipal ordinances that expressly targeted payment and 
transaction processing services for unregistered listings.  These ordinances directly implicated the 
conduct of the platforms—not the platforms’ users or their content.  By contrast, the supposed 
illegal act in the present case is the behavior of Turo’s users—who are conducting allegedly illegal 
exchanges at SFO.  
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SFO.3  However, the decisions to publish or exclude content—and what types of content to allow 
or disallow—are publisher decisions that are immunized under Section 230.  In Universal Commc’n 
Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), the court explained that Section 230 immunity 
“applies not only for the service provider’s decisions with respect to [a particular] posting, but also 
for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings generally” and a website’s decisions about 
“the construct and operation” of its site are protected because a decision to change its policies would 
be “as much an editorial decision with respect to [information it allows to be posted] as a decision 
not to delete a particular posting.”  Id. at 422 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss).  
Similarly, in Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017), plaintiffs were victims of sex trafficking and sued the defendant 
website based on the “choices that Backpage ha[d] made about the posting standards for [escort] 
advertisements—for example, rules about which terms are permitted or not permitted in a posting, 
the lack of controls on the display of phone numbers, the option to anonymize email addresses, the 
stripping of metadata from photographs uploaded to the website . . . , and Backpage’s acceptance 
of anonymous payments.”  Id. at 20.  Plaintiffs thus sought to hold Backpage liable not for any 
particular content, but for Backpage’s publisher-like decisions on what content could be provided 
on the website and how that content would be treated on the site, together with Backpage’s own 
development and provision of tools that made it easier for sex traffickers to post the subject content 
(ads for escort services) without being tracked or caught.  The court held that Backpage was 
immune under Section 230 because “the ‘publisher or speaker’ language of section 230(c)(1) 
extends to the formulation of precisely the sort of website policies and practices that the appellants 
assail.”  Id.  The features Backpage had created for its users “reflect choices about what content 
can appear on the website and in what form” and thus “are editorial choices that fall within the 
purview of traditional publisher functions”—regardless of whether or not they made it easier for 
sex traffickers to conduct their illegal activities.  Id. at 21 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss). 
Ultimately, “publishing” is broadly interpreted and “any activity that can be boiled down to 
                                                 
3 As discussed infra, section IV(B)(3), Plaintiff’s allegations that Turo suggests SFO as a location 
for rental exchanges are also insufficient to remove Turo from CDA immunity.  
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deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune 
under Section 230.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (italics added); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 
No. 17-CV-932 (VEC), 2018 WL 566457, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018) (“Courts have interpreted 
‘publication’ capaciously to reach claims that, although pleaded to avoid the CDA, ‘implicitly 
require recourse to that content [posted by a third party] to establish liability or implicate a 
defendant’s role, broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party [content].’”) (quoting 
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 156-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). 
As a result, Turo is immune under Section 230 because Plaintiff is attempting to hold Turo 
liable for prototypical publishing activity: decisions about what content can appear on its site.  
c. That Turo’s users’ offline exchange of vehicles at SFO is at issue 
does not remove Turo from the protections of Section 230. 
Finally, Plaintiff may argue that because the allegedly unlawful activity—Turo’s users’ 
exchanges at SFO and the necessary use of SFO roads—occurred offline, Turo is not entitled to 
Section 230 protection.  Not so.  Courts consistently apply Section 230 to grant immunity to 
websites where an online interaction leads to alleged offline harm.  For example, in Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit found social networking website 
MySpace immune for negligence and gross negligence claims related to an offline sexual assault 
involving two people who met on the platform.  Id. at 419-20 (affirming grant of motion for 
judgment on the pleadings).  The Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that their “claims 
against MySpace do not attempt to treat it as a ‘publisher’ of information,” and affirmed the lower 
court decision, which held the following:  
It is quite obvious the underlying basis of Plaintiffs’ claims is that, through postings on 
MySpace, Pete Solis and Julie Doe met and exchanged personal information which 
eventually led to an in-person meeting and the sexual assault of Julie Doe.  If MySpace 
had not published communications between Julie Doe and Solis, including personal 
contact information, Plaintiffs assert they never would have met and the sexual assault 
never would have occurred.  No matter how artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their 
claims, the Court views Plaintiffs’ claims as directed toward MySpace in its publishing, 
editorial, and/or screening capacities. 
Id.   
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Likewise, in Dyroff, the court found a website to be immune from claims of negligence and 
premises liability following an offline drug overdose resulting from user postings soliciting the sale 
of drugs on a website.  2017 WL 5665670, at *7.  There, an individual posted to defendant Ultimate 
Software’s social media platform that he wanted to purchase heroin in his area.  Id. at *2.  A dealer 
responded and the website notified him of the response.  Id. at *2.  The user then obtained the 
dealer’s phone number via the site and ultimately met him in person—i.e., offline.  The user then 
purchased drugs (offline), took the drugs (offline) and suffered an overdose (offline).  Id. at *2.  
Plaintiffs argued that Ultimate Software was responsible for these harms that took place offline 
because its website had “steer[ed] users to ‘additional’ groups dedicated to the sale of such 
narcotics,” id. at *3, and because Ultimate Software had used “data mining techniques and machine 
learning algorithms and tools to collect, analyze, and learn the meaning and intent behind posts in 
order to recommend and steer vulnerable users . . . to forums frequented by drug users and dealers,” 
id. at *8 (quotations omitted).  The court found that Section 230 immunity applied despite the fact 
that the harms took place offline and that plaintiffs attempted to “plead around immunity by basing 
liability on [] [the] website’s tools.”  Id. at *7.     
The same reasoning applies here to bar Plaintiff’s claims against Turo.  As in Myspace and 
Dyroff, without the user listings and user activity on Turo’s website, the allegedly unlawful offline 
exchanges could not have occurred.  See also, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th at 
572-76 (Section 230 barred claims of negligence, gross negligence, and products liability related 
to offline sexual assault of users of MySpace by other users); Doe IX v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 
2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (similar); Gibson, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3-4 (Section 230 barred 
claims related to offline shooting with gun purchased via online service); Inman v. Technicolor 
USA, Inc., No. Civ. A. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (granting motion 
to dismiss and finding Section 230 barred product liability claims against eBay following purchase 
of vacuum tubes on eBay’s website that allegedly led to offline mercury poisoning).   
While Plaintiff may argue that it only seeks to regulate purely offline conduct (user 
exchanges at SFO), such an argument does not remove Plaintiff’s claim from the ambit of Section 
230 immunity.  Instead, Section 230 forbids the imposition of liability predicated on user-generated 
 COOLEY LLP 
ATTO RN EY S AT LAW 
SAN  FR AN C I SC O 
 
 15  
TURO’S MEMO ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S COMPL., CASE NO. CGC-18-563803  
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
content and bars claims that would require the service to police and remove user content, which 
would be the necessary result of requiring Turo to try to prevent user exchanges at SFO.  See 
Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319, 323 (D.N.J. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss; 
finding Section 230 barred claims that online service failed to monitor its website, thus enabling a 
minor to use the website, resulting in an offline sexual encounter between the minor and another 
user and the subsequent arrest of the user); Herrick, 2018 WL 566457, at *6 (granting motion to 
dismiss; finding Section 230 barred claims related to offline harassment resulting from false profile 
and rejected argument that website should be liable for failure to employ “adequate protections 
against impersonating or fake accounts” as that “is just another way of asserting that Grindr is liable 
because it fails to police and remove impersonating content”).   
Put differently, since any remedial action by Turo to prevent such offline exchanges would 
necessarily involve changing the structure of the Turo website to prevent future postings or policing 
user content to identify or remove such postings, Plaintiff’s claim falls squarely within the purview 
of Section 230 immunity.  See Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21 (Section 230(c)(1) blocks regulation of a 
website’s features, policies, and practices, which “reflect choices about what content can appear on 
the website and in what form” and thus “are editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions”); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 
2016) (Twitter’s decision to allow ISIS to have accounts “reflect choices about what [third-party] 
content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form” and is immune).  Indeed, as the court in Cohen 
explained, “Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by claims that explicitly point to third party 
content but also by claims which, though artfully pleaded to avoid direct reference, implicitly 
require recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a defendant’s role, broadly 
defined, in publishing or excluding third party communications[.]”  252 F. Supp. 3d at 156 
(emphasis supplied). 
Under this well-established line of authority, Turo cannot be held liable for its users’ offline 
exchanges of vehicles at SFO, which are necessarily derivative of its users’ online posts and 
activity.  Turo’s nexus to these vehicle exchanges is its role as publisher of its users’ content on the 
Turo platform.  Indeed, if Plaintiff’s theory were accepted, all websites that publish third-party 
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listings could be liable where those third parties subsequently do something allegedly unlawful 
offline.  Section 230 was enacted for the very purpose of preventing such liability.  
3. Turo is not an information content provider with respect to users’ listing 
and reserving of cars for exchange at SFO.  
To avoid the inevitable conclusion that its cause of action treats Turo as the publisher of 
third-party information, Plaintiff alleges that Turo assisted with the creation of these listings 
through its website design and marketing.  However, Turo’s alleged prompts, suggestions, and even 
encouragement to conduct exchanges at SFO do not make Turo an information content provider of 
its users’ listings and reservations under well-established Section 230 case law.  Ultimately, it is 
Turo’s users’ “voluntary inputs” that are responsible for the content at issue—the selection of SFO 
as an exchange location.  Dyroff, 2017 WL 5665670, at *10; (see Compl. ¶ 28 (“car owners [] select 
whether they are willing to deliver to various airports, including SFO”); id. (“car owners [] set a 
surcharge amount for airport delivery”)).  Under Section 230, Turo cannot be liable for these inputs 
where it does not materially contribute to their illegality.   
Internet service providers only become information content providers when they 
“materially contribut[e] to [the relevant content’s] alleged unlawfulness.”  Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1167-68.  In Roommates.com, the operator of a roommate-matching website posed a set of 
“discriminatory questions” to its users during the registration process with a “limited set of pre-
populated answers” and made “answering the discriminatory questions a condition of doing 
business.”  Id. at 1166.  “When a business enterprise extracts such information from potential 
customers as a condition of accepting them as clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is 
responsible, at least in part, for developing that information.”  Id.  Therefore, Roommate “materially 
contribut[ed] to its alleged unlawfulness.”  Id. at 1168.  In contrast, an interactive computer service 
will retain CDA immunity when it “merely provide[s] a framework that could be utilized for proper 
or improper purposes[.]”  Id. at 1168-69, 1172.  Thus, as the Roommates.com court noted, 
Roommate would have retained immunity if it merely allowed users to receive listings by “user-
defined criteria,” even if those criteria were discriminatory.  By contrast, where an online service 
requires illegal input, it loses immunity.  Id.  
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For this reason, the fact that Turo allows users to arrange exchanges at SFO and even 
suggests SFO (among other locations) as a possible vehicle exchange location (see Compl. ¶¶ 26-
28) does not deprive Turo of immunity.  Turo’s users ultimately select the location for pickups.  
(See id. ¶ 28 (“car owners [] select whether they are willing to deliver to various airports, including 
SFO . . . car owners [] set a surcharge amount for airport delivery”).)  Turo does not require any 
particular location and does not require users to select SFO as the exchange site.4   
The court’s analysis in Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2010), is 
instructive and demonstrates that Turo does not lose Section 230 immunity by suggesting SFO as 
an exchange location.  In Jurin, plaintiff alleged that Google’s advertising service had suggested 
plaintiff’s trademarked name, “Styrotrim,” as a keyword for competitors to purchase, and brought 
a Lanham Act claim against Google.  Plaintiff argued that by suggesting trademarked keywords, 
Google became an “information content provider” with respect to the suggestions and thus could 
not claim immunity for claims based on that content.  Id. at 1123.  The court disagreed, holding:  
By suggesting keywords to competing advertisers [Google] merely helps third parties to refine their content.  This is tantamount to the editorial process protected by the CDA.  Defendant’s keyword suggestion tool hardly amounts to the participation necessary to disqualify it of CDA immunity.  Rather it is a ‘neutral tool,’ that does nothing more than provide options that advertisers could adopt or reject at their discretion, thus entitling the operator to immunity.   
Id. (granting motion to dismiss) (quoting Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197-98 
(N.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197-98 (similar; granting motion to 
dismiss); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d, 676 
F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (“By making available keyword tools and providing advertisers the ability 
to refine their keyword term selection, Google does not create the Sponsored Link contents but 
merely exercises editorial discretion.”). 
Numerous other opinions similarly hold that providing tools that can be used for lawful or 
                                                 
4 Turo’s other tools (see Compl. ¶¶ 22-24, 29) are also irrelevant to the CDA analysis, as none of 
them turn Turo from a platform into an information content provider.  See, e.g., La Park La Brea, 
285 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (collecting payments, offering photography, providing a pricing tool, 
providing host insurance and guest refund policy not sufficient to make Airbnb an information 
content provider). 
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unlawful purposes does not transform an online service into an information content provider even 
where the service suggests or encourages the allegedly illegal content.  For example, in Hill v. 
StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. at 242, plaintiffs alleged that online ticket-resale platform StubHub 
violated anti-scalping laws by providing tools which “encourage[d] the reselling of tickets at a price 
substantially above face value.” Id. at 245.  On appeal, the court found that “the decisions 
construing [Section 230] have generally held that, if the tools provided by a website may be used 
to generate either lawful or unlawful content depending on decisions made by the user, these tools 
are ‘neutral’ and do not implicate the website in the development of unlawful content.”  Id. at 241.  
The court further noted that “the fact that a website acted in such a manner as to encourage the 
publication of unlawful material does not preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to [Section 
230].”  Id. at 242.  Rather, to lose immunity, StubHub would have to “essentially ensure[]” the 
unlawful content.  Id. at 244.  Likewise, Turo provides its users with tools to make decisions about 
where to conduct exchanges.  While Turo may suggest a nearby airport, such as SFO, as a location, 
Turo does not require users to make their exchanges at SFO.   
Similarly, in Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), 
plaintiff argued that consumer review website PissedConsumer was not entitled to Section 230 
immunity because it had “encourag[ed] negative complaints” and “display[ed] those negative 
postings as prominently as possible” if plaintiff (the subject of the negative reviews) did not pay 
PissedConsumer for reputation management services.  Id. at 475.  The court disagreed, holding that 
“there is simply ‘no authority for the proposition that [encouraging the publication of defamatory 
content] makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or 
development’ of every post on the site.’”  Id. at 476 (alterations in original) (quoting Global 
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008)); see also 
Backpage, 817 F.3d at 16 (plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage “deliberate[ly] structur[ed] [] its 
website to facilitate sex trafficking” and that the resultant rules and processes “are designed to 
encourage sex trafficking” did not remove Backpage from Section 230 immunity).  
Similarly, in Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124, an actress sued a dating website for a fake profile 
of the actress an anonymous user had created, resulting in the actress being deluged by sexually 
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explicit phone calls, voicemails, and letters.  Plaintiff alleged that the website required users to fill 
out a questionnaire that included multiple-choice questions with answers created by the website, 
many of which included sexually suggestive phrases.  The court held that although “the 
questionnaire facilitated the expression of information by individual users,” “the selection of the 
content was left exclusively to the user” and “Matchmaker cannot be considered an ‘information 
content provider’ under the statute because no profile has any content until a user actively creates 
it.”  Id. at 1124 (emphasis added); see also Herrick, 2018 WL 566457, at *1  (finding that Grindr’s 
“algorithmic sorting and filtering software” did not make Grindr an information content provider); 
Saponaro, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 324 (“questions to be answered including a profile, the posting of 
pictures, and dropdown menus suggesting content” do not constitute content development).  Like 
the interactive computer services in these cases, Turo provides a platform with no requirements or 
mandates as to what can be posted by third-party users in response to its prompts and suggestions. 
Ultimately, as the court notes in Roommates.com:  
Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where a 
clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the 
illegality.  Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest 
we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand 
duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly 
assented to—the illegality of third parties.  
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174-75 (emphasis in original) (finding Roommate immune from 
claims arising from a section of its website prompting users to leave “additional comments,” as it 
was only a “generic text prompt”).  This court should find in favor of immunity and dismiss the 
complaint against Turo.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Section 230 mandates dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Turo.  
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Document title:
Defendant and Cross-ComplainantTuro Incs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion forJudgment on the
Plaintiffs Complaint
Attached Document, 7 Pages Document ID: 81363713
Document Type: Access: Statutory Fee: Linked:
Declaration Public X0.00
Document title:
Declaration of Matthew D. Brown in Support of Defendant and Cross-Complainant Turo Incs Motion for~udgment on the
Pleadings on Plaintiffs Complaint
Attached Document, 4 Pages Document ID: 81363714
Document Type: Access: Statutory Fee: Linked:
Notice of Payment for Court Reporter Fee Public $30.00
Document title:
Notice of Payment for Court Reporter Fee of Defendant and Cross-Complainant Turo Incs Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings
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Service 
California 
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Natalie
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Yvonne Mere yvonne.mere@sfcityatty.org
Jaime Huling Delaye Jaime.hulingdelaye@sfcityatty.org
Tammy Zughayer tzughayer@cooley.com
Bethany Lobo blobo@cooley.com
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